James Harland recently argued in his post that Groupon is not as deserving of its latest high valuation. Although I believe Groupon is a great business with enormous potential, I agree with James that it’s not a good idea for many sellers, specifically low margin vendors like restaurants. Among all the reasons James gives to be wary of Groupon’s potential, the most compelling challenge is its business’s low barriers to entry.
To understand why, let’s first take a look at the economics that underlie the value proposition for restaurants.
Assumptions on average deal:
- Restaurant profit margins after variable costs – 20%
- Sales less COGS, labor
- Bill size (for two) – $50
- Groupon – $25 off $50 purchase
- Restaurant payment to Groupon – $10
Value to Restaurant from Groupon to New Customers
Assuming a bill size of $50 and margins of 20%, the restaurant gains $10 every visit. On the first visit, the restaurant loses the initial $10 (payment to Groupon) and $25 (discount on bill), so it nets a loss of $25. Therefore, the customer needs to go back to the restaurant at least three additional times on average before it even breaks even.
Value to Restaurant from Groupon to Existing Customers
If the customer was going to go to the restaurant anyway, then it nets a loss of $35 from the payment to groupon and the discount on bill.
The table below illustrates what these economics mean for restaurants.
| % of Groupons to New Customers | Avg. Number of Visits per New Customer Required to Breakeven |
| 10% | 35.0 |
| 25% | 14.0 |
| 50% | 7.0 |
| 75% | 4.7 |
| 100% | 3.5 |
These numbers suggest that if a restaurant is already very successful with existing customers who tend to be very loyal AND if the restaurant has unused capacity, then using Groupon can be a profitable endeavor. But even those restaurants require a very high mix of coupon purchasers to be new customers.
Customers don’t decide from whom to receive an email, Groupon or LivingSocial… they sign up for all of them! Customers decide which coupons to purchase. When customers have more choices, they are more likely to purchase a coupon from a restaurant they already go to. So whereas a Groupon deal may have once yielded 75% new customers, the emergence of so many competitors has resulted in a much lower mix. Personally speaking, around 25% of the coupons I buy are for new places, and there is no way I’m going back to those places 14 times. I’m sure most restaurants will eventually realize these economics don’t work for them.
It’s obviously a problem when potential customers choose to buy their coupons from competitors instead of with them. But it’s an even bigger problem when the emergence of competitors serves to undermine your entire business model. Groupon (or any other Groupon clone) should forget about restaurants completely and build a brand around being the premier provider of coupons for higher margin service businesses.
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